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Since the early  1980s,  U.S. agriculture has been suffering through
the effects of the convergence  of two powerful sets of forces: (1) a huge
and  concentrated  debt  burden  that has  assumed  awesome  propor-
tions  for indebted  individuals and firms in the unfriendly economic
environment  of the  1980s  (Harl  1986c)'  and (2) the persistence  of a
capacity  to overproduce  for both  domestic  use  and the amount that
can  be  moved  into  export  channels  under current  economic  condi-
tions. The combined forces have been unparalleled in magnitude and
unrivaled in the speed with which they impacted the sector.
The problem  of overproduction  has continued for more than a half
century and shows no sign of abating. In fact, the limited opportuni-
ties to increase the demand for agricultural  products and the proba-
bilities for substantial  increases in supply through the introduction
of new technology  over the next two  decades  promise to exacerbate
that aspect of the problem.
The magnitude and concentration  of the debt load for U.S.  agricul-
ture  are  phenomena  of short-run  proportions.  Either through  pay-
ment, debt restructuring  or the discharge  of indebtedness,  the debt
burden  will  very  likely  shrink to manageable  proportions  over  the
next three to five years.
The General Setting
Rapid economic and social change in agriculture  is not a new phe-
nomenon.  Since  the  beginning  of recorded  history,  agriculture  has
been adjusting to conditions of greater efficiency.  As a consequence,
the percentage  of the  population  and the percentage  of the  capital
stock  required  to  produce  needed  food  and  fiber  products  have  de-
clined  steadily.  The  decline  has  been  especially  marked  since  the
1930s as developments  in plant and animal breeding and machinery
and  chemical  usage,  and  improvements  in  farmers'  management
ability have  combined  to cause an  acceleration  in the  movement  of
labor  out of the  sector.  Agriculture  has  truly  been  a  development
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ing labor and capital  for use in the nonfarm  economy.  The develop-
ment occurring in agriculture  has been enormously  beneficial to the
general economy, permitting the allocation of resources to a burgeon-
ing service sector and to high technology  manufacturing and product
development.  However,  had agriculture been frozen by the implemen-
tation  of highly protective  policies  in the condition it was in in the
early  1920s  at  the  beginning  of  two  decades  of  severe  economic
trauma,  society could have been denied the resources needed  to sup-
port the enormous  development effort of the past half century.
What  is now occurring in agriculture  in terms of firms failing, be-
cause equity is exhausted or operating  credit  is denied, has little to
do with  efficiency  and does not represent a continuation  of the long-
term trend toward greater efficiency in agriculture.  In fact, the firms
now at  risk are  some  of the  most  efficient  in the  industry  and are
operating  at or  near the minimum  point  on the  long-term  average
total  cost  curve  except  for  one  factor:  the  amount  of debt  held  is
excessive  as  measured  by  the  economic  environment  of the  1980s.
Those who  survive are not necessarily the most efficient  and in fact
tend to be the  older,  more cautious farmers  with smaller operations
and  little or  no  debt.  Thus, the  phenomenon  cuts  across  farm and
ranch firms in a highly arbitrary manner.
The data are making it increasingly clear that agriculture  is going
through the most wrenching  financial adjustment in a half century.
Not  since  the  1930s  have  issues  of  debtor  distress  gripped  rural
America  as they have in the 1980s.
*  In several  agricultural  states,  land values  have dropped  by  as
much  as  60  percent  since  1981,  cutting  enormous  amounts  of
collateral value  and wealth from balance  sheets and increasing
the economic  vulnerability  of even those who  survive.
*  The numbers  of farm  foreclosures,  forfeitures  of land contracts
and  defaults  on  notes  have  reached  levels  not  seen  since  the
days of the Great Depression.
*  The  level  of  emotional  trauma  being  suffered  by  indebted
farmers  and  small  business  persons  is  a  tragedy  of awesome
proportions.
The  scope  of the  problem  is  much broader  than farms.  Although
economic  stress gained  a foothold among the more heavily  indebted
farmers,  the  phenomenon  has  escalated  rapidly  so  that  today  it
threatens  to  engulf the  entire  rural  community.  Diminished  eco-
nomic vitality in rural communities, as purchases have been deferred
and employment  lost, has led to failing businesses,  unpaid property
taxes and reduced ability  to support governmental  services.  The ef-
fects  on school districts,  health care  delivery  systems,  local units of
government and other rural area institutions have tended to lag the
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rural areas may lead to a significant reduction in the quality of life.
The data make it clear that although the severity varies from area
to area and the upper  Midwest  has suffered the  most,  agricultural
stress virtually blankets the country.
Why the Problem Exists
Finger pointing and accusations  of culpability  do little to remedy
the plight of rural communities.  But in choosing  remedial policy  in-
struments, it is important to recognize the roots of the problem.  Two
principal  categories  of forces  are  responsible  for  much  of the  eco-
nomic  woes  of agriculture:  (1) federal  policies  that created  an  eco-
nomic  environment  highly  unfavorable  for  agriculture  and  other
sectors that  are both  capital  intensive  and export  sensitive  and (2)
forces operating  at  the farm  or ranch  level that  moved  some  firms
into a "window  of vulnerability"  which,  combined with the unfavor-
able economic environment, was sufficient to move the firms inexora-
bly toward insolvency.
Federal policies. Three  federal  policies  operating  over  nearly two
decades  created  an  economic  environment  that,  in  the  1980s,  has
been highly unfavorable for agriculture.  A relatively low cash rate of
return for many farm assets, a high level of capital intensity for U.S.
agriculture  and sensitivity  to changes in export supply and demand
conditions in the international farm commodity  markets have mag-
nified the impacts of these policies upon farm firms.
*  The first such federal policies were those enacted over five differ-
ent federal administrations that treated inflation as an expected
part of economic life. The relatively high rate of inflation result-
ing from the budget strains  of the Viet Nam conflict  was com-
pounded  by the effects  of rapid increases  in energy costs  after
1972. By the late 1970s, the persistence  of inflation in the econ-
omy had led to widespread  efforts  at accommodation.  The  most
common  strategy  for  accommodating  inflation  was  to  index
one's  economic  fortunes  to  the rate  of inflation.  Thus,  Social
Security benefits and taxes were indexed, presidential authority
was granted to adjust federal  civil service  compensation  levels,
basic compensation  levels  in many  labor  union contracts  were
indexed and,  beginning in  1985,  the entire  income tax system
was indexed.
Farmers, unable to index with the same degree of effectiveness, in
some instances accelerated the purchase of capital assets in the face
of consistent  increases  in the cost of machinery and equipment  and
in the price  of land.  The  differential  effect  of the two  responses  to
inflation  became  painfully  clear  in  the  early  1980s.  Indexing  is  a
benign strategy in an era of declining rates of inflation. Anticipating
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with financial commitments to be met.
The  experience  of the  inflationary  era  of the  1960s  and  1970s
makes  it  clear  that an  enormous  price  is paid  when  expectations
about  conditions  that  should  be  viewed  as  aberrational  in  nature
harden into a belief that the condition is permanent.
*  The  second  important  factor  was  the  decision  by  the  Federal
Reserve  Board in October  of 1979 to wring inflation  out of the
United States  economy.  The action to limit the supply of credit
led  almost  immediately  to high  nominal  interest rates  which
eventually  served to  dampen the level  of economic  activity.  In
the first half of the 1980s,  inflation  dropped from the  13 to  15
percent range to  3 to 4  percent. Thus the gains from inflation,
which  were  substantial  during the  decade  of the  1970s,  were
dramatically  reduced,  leaving farm  debt to be  serviced largely
from current income.
*  The third significant  factor contributing to an unfavorable  eco-
nomic environment for agriculture  in the 1980s appears to have
been enactment  of the Economic Recovery  Tax Act of 1981.  The
1981  legislation  was enacted with the realization that an esti-
mated $872 billion in revenue  would be cut from the federal tax
system  through  fiscal  year  1986.  Cuts  of that magnitude  as-
sured massive federal budget deficits.
The result of these  policies has been  an economic  environment  of
low  inflation  and record  setting real interest rates boosted by tight
credit and strong private  sector demand for capital. For agriculture,
the result has been (1) a strong dollar that in recent months has set
records  against other  currencies and that has cost  U.S.  agriculture
dearly in terms of exports of farm commodities, (2) high interest rates
that  have  greatly  increased  the  cost  of  production  for  indebted
farmers  and (3) falling land values as potential  investors have been
confronted with the reality of 8 to 12 percent real interest rates and
the  reassessment  of land  as  an  alternative  investment  in the  eco-
nomic environment  of the 1980s.
Factors contributing to farmer vulnerability. In the economic envi-
ronment  of the last four or five years, any factor that made a farmer
vulnerable  by increasing the debt load was sufficient  to assure  eco-
nomic difficulty. It was the resulting "window  of vulnerability"  that
set the stage  for financial stress.
*  Beginning farmers  are almost  always  vulnerable the first  sev-
eral years of operation. Part of the uniqueness of family farms is
that families accumulate most of the equity capital for the firm
from  earnings. The  result is economic  vulnerability  during the
first several  years of life of farm firms. That has certainly been
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danger  of losing much of a generation of young farmers.
*  Adverse weather conditions have been costly to farmers affected.
In  some areas  beginning  in  1980  unusual  weather conditions,
both too wet and too dry, resulted in loss of part or all of a crop.
*  Losses  in  cattle  feeding  in  the  1970s  and  even  losses  in  hog
production  in  more recent  time have increased  debt loads and,
thus,  vulnerability.  For  about half of the months  over the last
five years,  hog production  has been at a loss. Losses in cow-calf
enterprises in recent years have been perhaps less visible but no
less devastating.
*  Expansion to bring a family member  into the operation has in-
creased debt loads. The economics of farming in recent years has
encouraged  the  continuation  of family  operations  with  owner-
ship and management transferred to the next generation.
*  Major purchases of land, machinery or livestock facilities in the
late  1970s and early  1980s also increased  economic  vulnerabil-
ity.
Any event or series of events that placed a farmer in the window of
vulnerability  has proved to be economically devastating. Once in the
window  of vulnerability,  the firm was moved  toward insolvency  at a
breathtaking pace by high real interest rates.
Nature and Severity  of the Farm Financial Problem
Never  in the history  of U.S.  agriculture  have problems  of debtor
distress occurred  where there was greater heterogeneity  in financial
condition among farmers  and ranchers.
Amount and distribution  of debt.  The amount of debt in U.S. agri-
culture has increased dramatically  since  1950 as shown in Figure  1
(U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  1985).  Farm  debt  outstanding  in
1950 totaled $11.2  billion,  rising to more than $216 billion nation-
ally in  1983 before commencing  a decline  in 1984 as some debt was
paid off or  otherwise  discharged  and as the  economic  environment
discouraged the contracting of new debt.
The rate  of increase in personal, business and federal government
debt has been similar as shown in Figure  2.
Extent of financial stress.  As of January,  1986,  approximately  22
percent of the farmers  nationally had debt-to-asset  ratios  of greater
than 40  percent  and  were  responsible  for  about  66  percent  of the
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Figure 2:  National, Personal and Business Debt.
Sources:  Federal  Reserve Board and  U.S.  Dept. of Commerce
been thought that farmers with debt-to-asset ratios below 40 percent
would be able to service their debt and pay other costs when due even
in a setting of real interest rates prevalent in the mid-1980s  and the
rates  of return  for  agricultural  assets  common  in  the  mid-1980s
(Reinsel  and Reinsel  1986).  Recent  data raise a question  about that
assumption with  some below the  40 percent  line moving toward  in-
solvency.
76Table 1. Percentage of Farms and Debt to Asset  Ratio for Each Region and for the United
States,  January, 1986.
41-70  71-100  Over  100
Farms  Debt  Farms  Debt  Farms  Debt
Northeast  9.3  27.3  3.3  23.0  1.4  9.1
Lake States  19.1  35.2  7.3  37.8  6.4  18.9
Corn Belt  15.6  35.7  5.6  37.1  5.1  16.7
Northern Plains  17.6  34.0  8.8  40.1  6.8  19.8
Appalachian  6.7  23.0  1.1  25.6  1.5  13.7
Southeast  9.8  37.8  3.4  28.7  2.6  15.3
Delta States  7.7  29.0  3.0  41.8  5.8  28.6
Southern Plains  9.0  25.4  3.2  26.8  3.0  15.9
Mountain States  16.0  36.4  4.9  24.6  2.9  9.8
Pacific States  10.5  31.8  4.0  30.2  2.1  10.7
United States  12.7  NA  4.6  NA  4.0  NA
Source: Financial  Characteristics  of US. Farms, January  1, 1986, Agr. Inf. Bull. No.  500, Econ.  Res. Service,  U.S.
Department of Agriculture, August,  1986, App. Tables  8, 12.
Moreover, the problem in some  regions  is substantially  more  seri-
ous  than  the  national  data  indicate.  A  January,  1985,  survey  in
North Dakota  indicated that 36  percent  of the farmers  had debt-to-
asset ratios in excess of 40 percent,  held 37 percent  of the assets and
accounted  for 74 percent of the debt.  Table 2 shows the Iowa data as
of January,  1984.
Table 2. Financial Condition  of Sample  Iowa  Farmers by 1984  Debt-to-Asset  Ratio, Janu-
ary,  1984.
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233  298  271  172  131  261
121  189  306  382  198  193
Source:  1985 Iowa Farm Finance  Survey,  Iowa Department of Agriculture,  Iowa  State  University and  Iowa  Crop
and Livestock Reporting  Service.
In Iowa more than one-third  of the farmers,  averaging 59 years of
age, had little or no debt as  of January,  1984, with debt-to-asset  ra-
tios  of 10 percent  or  less. Slightly  more  than one-third  (37 percent)
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thought  that  the  11-40  percent  group  would  be  able  to  stabilize
their financial  condition  although  the upper  quarter  of that group
was encountering  financial  stress. The  remaining  24  percent  of the
operators  were  severely  impacted  and  were  moving  toward  insol-
vency or  were  already  insolvent.  Balance  sheet data  for  Iowa as  of
January,  1985, are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3.  Distribution of Operators, Assets,  and Debt of Sample Farmers, by  1985  Debt-to-
Asset  Ratio, January, 1985.
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
0-10  11-40  41-70  71-100  Over 100  All Farms
Operators (percent)  35  32  21  7  4
Assets (percent)  29  34  28  7  2
Debt (percent)  2  25  48  17  8
Source:  1985 Iowa Farm Finance  Survey,  Iowa Department of Agriculture,  Iowa State University  and  Iowa  Crop
and  Livestock Reporting Service.
Table 4.  Financial Condition of Sample  Iowa Farmers by  1984 Debt-to-Asset  Ratio, Janu-
ary, 1985.
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
0-10  11-40  41-70  71-100  Over 100  All Farms
Average  assets
per farm  $411,000  $578,000  $625,000  $347,000  $171,000  $506,000
Average debt
per farm  $18,000  $170,000  $388,000  $336,000  $244,000  $161,000
Average equity
per farm  $393,000  $408,000  $237,000  $11,000  -$73,000  $345,000
Average loss
of equity
in 1984  -20.1%  -23.6%  -34.5%  -88.4%
Source:  1985 Iowa Farm Finance Survey, Iowa  Department  of Agriculture,  Iowa State University  and Iowa  Crop
and Livestock Reporting  Service.
The data indicate that a movement has occurred of borrowers in the
41-70  percent  category  into the over  70  percent  group.  Moreover,  a
significant  number  from  the  11- 40  percent  category  have  moved
into the 41-70  group. On the average,  farmers who were in the 71-
100  percent  debt-to-asset  ratio category  as of January  1, 1984,  lost
$84,000  (88.4 percent)  of their equity during  1984.  Thus, the rate  of
deterioration in financial condition has been great. Even those in the
0-10  percent  debt-to-asset  category  on  January  1,  1984,  lost  20.1
percent  of their equity  in  1984,  principally  because  of declines  in
asset values.
The  U.S.  Department  of Agriculture  (U.S. Department  of Agricul-
ture  1986) estimates that about 20 percent  of all farms with annual
sales in excess of $40,000 had both negative  cash flow and a debt-to-
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percent  of all U.S.  farms were  experiencing  a negative  or zero  cash
flow  as of that date. About  750,000 farms reported  a  negative  cash
flow, with the largest number (595,000) having debt-to-asset  ratios of
40 percent or less (U.S. Department of Agriculture  1986).
A survey  of nine Midwest  states in early  1986 confirmed that the
financial  condition  of farmers  has continued to deteriorate  (Wiscon-
sin Agricultural  Reporting Service  1986).  As shown in Table 5,  28.1
percent  of the  farmers  reported  debt-to-asset  ratios  in  excess  of 40
percent.  In Iowa, the figure was 38.3 percent.
Table 5. Comparison of Debt to Asset  Ratios For All  Farms Among  States
Percent of farmers
Average  with debt/asset  ratioPercent
debt/asset  Less  Between  More  quitting
States  ratio  than 40  40  and 69  than 69  1986
Illinois  .308  70.6  18.2  11.2  5.0
Iowa  .369  61.7  22.1  16.2  4.9
Kansas  .318  69.2  18.3  12.5  5.6
Michigan  .286  76.9  17.6  5.5  4.3
Missouri  .247  78.8  14.1  7.1  6.0
Nebraska  .343  63.2  23.0  13.8  6.4
North  Dakota  .347  62.2  23.1  14.7  3.0
Ohio  .212  82.8  12.6  4.6  5.0
Wisconsin  .262  74.7  18.7  6.6  4.4
Nine states  .294  71.9  18.1  10.0  5.1
Source: Midwest 1986 Farm Finance  Report, Wisconsin Agricultural  Reporting  Service, Madison, Wisconsin.
Of the farmers reporting debt, 45.6 percent in Iowa (and an average
of 38.1 percent for the nine states) were above the 40 percent mark as
shown in Table  6.
The  nine Midwest states reported that  10.3 percent of the farmers
were  delinquent  on real  estate  loans  and  12.3  percent  were  delin-
Table 6. Farm Assets  and Debt in Midwest States
State  Nine
Item  IL  IA  KS  MI  MO  NE  ND  OH  WI  States
Thousands  dollars
Average  Total Assets
All farms  380  367  282  347  228  426  447  287  357  334
Farms with debt  420  392  314  413  253  457  470  326  404  369
Average  Total Debt
All farms  117  135  90  99  56  146  155  61  94  100
Farms with debt  159  179  131  151  94  181  188  104  133  142
Debt-to-Asset Ratio
All farms  30.8  36.9  31.8  28.6  24.7  34.3  34.7  21.2  26.2  29.4
Farms with debt  37.8  45.6  41.7  36.5  37.0  39.6  40.0  31.8  32.9  38.1
Source:  Midwest 1986 Farm Finance Report, Wisconsin Agricultural  Reporting Service,  Madison,  Wisconsin.
79quent on non real estate loans as shown in Table 7. Kansas reported
the highest delinquency rate on real estate loans (17.6  percent) with
Michigan  showing  the highest  delinquency  rate  on non real estate
loans (15.6 percent).
Table 7. Status of Debt
State  Nine
Item  IL  IA  KS  MI  MO  NE  ND  OH  WI  States
Percent
Real Estate Loans
Farms with loans  53.6  56.7  51.2  54.4  46.4  59.4  63.6  45.7  57.9  53.2
Farms delinquent
on loans  11.6  11.9  17.6  9.7  10.0  8.2  11.6  6.2  7.0  10.3
Non-Real  Estate Loans
Farms with loans  60.4  62.1  57.4  50.9  43.9  67.8  73.1  43.0  52.0  55.0
Farms delinquent
on loans  14.3  14.5  13.4  15.6  9.9  9.7  12.5  7.2  14.6  12.3
Source: Midwest 1986 Farm Finance Report, Wisconsin  Agricultural  Reporting Service,  Madison,  Wisconsin.
By focusing  on the farm  business,  Lines and Morehart  found the
state of financial  stress to be  much  greater than  reported  when off-
farm  income  is  eliminated  and  account  is  taken  of  inventory
changes,  depreciation  and unpaid  family labor.  In that analysis,  70
percent  of all farms  and 40 percent  of commercial  farms had  "poor
financial  health"  and were  in "serious  financial  difficulty."2 As the
authors  note,  "policies  grounded  in the  concept  that the  economic
well-being of farm businesses includes off-farm income, foster a farm
sector dependent  upon off-farm  income  and unable  to pay all its ex-
penses" (Lines and Morehart,  p.  16).
The financial condition of farm and ranch firms may also be evalu-
ated on the basis of return to equity.  As can  be  seen from Table  8,
29.1  percent of the operators  have an estimated  return  to equity  of
less than -.05 percent (U.S. Department  of Agriculture  1986). Those
operators hold about 17.9 percent of the assets but are responsible  for
more than  36 percent  of the debt.  At the same time,  more  than 44
percent  of the U.S.  farm operators had a return to equity of greater
than  5  percent.  That group held  more than 42  percent  of the assets
and about 46 percent  of the farm debt.
The data make it abundantly clear that enough assets and debt are
held by farmers who are unstable economically to assure that further
weakness  in land and machinery  (below 1986  levels) is likely unless
(1) farm incomes rise substantially, (2) real interest rates for agricul-
tural lending decline significantly  or (3) major public-sector  interven-
tion efforts are implemented  to stabilize the agricultural  sector.
80Table 8. Distribution of Farm Operators, Debt, and Assets  by Household Return to Equity
for the United States, January 1, 1985a.
Less  -.20  -.10  -.05  .05  .10
Insolvent  Than  to  to  to  to  to  Greater  All
Region  Farms  -.21  -. 11  -.06  .04  .09  .19  than  .19  Farms
Percent
operators
b 4.0  9.2  7.8  8.1  26.4  10.8  12.3  21.4  100.00
Percent
debtc  16.2  9.67  5.05  5.45  17.75  9.22  11.9  25.0  100.00
Percent
assetsd  2.79  4.4  4.5  6.3  39.5  13.1  13.5  16.0  100.00
Source:  U.S. Department of Agriculture. Financial  Characteristics  of US.  Farms, January  1, 1986. Washington  DC:
Agr. Info.  Bull. No.  500, Table  5,  Aug.  1986.
aReturn  to equity  is  net  cash  income from  the farming  operation  plus  nonfarm  income minus  estimated  living
allowance  divided by operator farm equity.
bPercent of U.S. farms.
Percent of U.S.  operator debt.
dPercent  of U.S. operator assets.
The impact  of debtor distress on lenders has been substantial.  In
1985, the Farm Credit System incurred a $2.7 billion loss, the largest
one-year  loss of any U.S.  financial institution.  A total of 68 agricul-
tural  banks  failed  in  1985  out of a  total  of  120  failed banks.  The
concentration  of debt among the most heavily  indebted farmers indi-
cates that further deterioration  of the financial condition of lenders
is  a  virtual  certainty.  As  shown  in  Table  9,  a total  of almost  $38
Table 9. Debt Owed  By  Farm Operators
Source:  U.S.  Department of Agriculture.  Financial  Characteristics  of US. Farms, January 1, 1986. Washington,
DC:  Agr. Info. Bull. No.  500, Table  10, Aug. 1986.
aUSDA  acknowledges  that the figure given for  "operator debt"  is about $91  billion less than that for the sector
with  about $39 billion in "unexplained  differences"  (U.S. Department  of Agriculture  1986, p.  33).
billion of debt is held by farm  operators with debt-to-asset  ratios  in
excess  of 70 percent (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1986, Table  10).
For operators with debt-to-asset ratios above 40 percent, the figure is
more than $75  billion  (U.S.  Department of Agriculture  1986).  Com-
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Debt-to-Asset Ratio, January  1, 1986
0-40  41-70  71-100  Over 100  Total
Lender  Million  dollars
Commercial  banks  12,007  10,508  4,284  4,263  31,072
Federal  Land Banks  8,164  8,936  5,380  2,663  25,142
FmHA  2,626  4,833  3,538  6,035  17,082
Production  Credit Assns.  3,704  2,951  1,116  1,037  8,807
Commodity Credit Corp.  2,652  2,988  1,467  1,146  8,253
Other individuals  5,042  3,950  2,092  1,544  12,628
Others  2,847  2,378  1,089  823  7,136
Merchants  and dealers  766  446  317  330  1,860
Other farmers  386  258  410  364  1,419
All farms  38,195  37,248  19,692  18,205  113,389
amercial banks hold about  27 percent  of operator  debt (see Table  10)
but almost 61 percent of those loans are held by operators above a 40
Table  10. Distribution of Debt Owed  by Farm Operators
Percentage  of their
loan portfolio owed by
Percentage  of  operators over 40 percent
Lender  operator loans  debt-to-asset  ratio
Commercial  banks  27  61
Federal  Land Banks  22  68
FmHA  15  84
Production  Credit Assn's.  8  58
Commodity  Credit Corp.  7  68
Other individuals  11  60
Others  6  60
Merchants  and dealers  2  59
Other farmers  1  72
Source:  U.S.  Department  of Agriculture. Financial Characteristics  of US. Farms, January 1, 1986. Washington,
DC: Agr. Info. Bull.  No. 600,  Table 11,  Aug. 1986.
percent  debt-to-asset  ratio.  Just  under  14  percent  of their  debt  is
owed by insolvent farmers.
*  Federal Land Banks, with 22 percent of operator  debt, have 68
percent held by operators above the 40 percent line. Just over 10
percent of their debt is owed by insolvent farmers.
*  The Farmers Home Administration (FmHA), holding 15 percent
of the debt, has 84 percent concentrated  in the hands of opera-
tors with debt-to-asset  ratios in excess of 40 percent.  More than
35  percent  of  the  debt  held  by  FmHA  is  owed  by  insolvent
farmers.
*  For Production  Credit Associations,  with 8 percent  of the opera-
tor debt, 58 percent is held by operators with debt-to-asset ratios
above 40 percent. Just under 12 percent of their debt is owed by
insolvent farmers.
As loan losses have mounted, farm lenders, in their role as brokers
of funds,  have  "socialized"  the  costs involved  by maintaining farm
loan  interest  rates  several  points  above  normal  equilibrium  rates.
This has been made possible by the diminished competition in rural
areas  among  lenders  as  loan  losses  have  risen.  As  a  consequence,
borrowers  not in financial  difficulty are paying a substantial part of
the  costs  of those  unable  to  pay  principal  and  interest  when  due
(Gabriel and Prentice).3
Unless  something dramatic  is  done  or  circumstances  change,  as
many  as  one-third  of the nation's  farmers  will  move to  insolvency,
taking down their lenders, their suppliers and other merchants and
inflicting incalculable  damage upon the fabric of rural communities.
Discharged indebtedness goes ricocheting through local communities
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with  the  weakness  in  land  and  machinery  markets,  even  secured
creditors  are,  in  reality,  only partially  secured  as collateral  values
have slipped below loan balances.
Is Further Federal Intervention Needed?
Federal intervention is not new to U.S. agriculture.  Since 1933, the
economic fortunes of agriculture in this country have been shaped by
federal  legislation.  The  Food  Security  Act  of  1985  and  the  Farm
Credit Amendments Act of 1985 represent additional intervention by
the federal government.
A  key question at this juncture:  Is further intervention  necessary
or, if not necessary, desirable?
Need for further intervention. Both in light  of the inability  of the
farm bill to stabilize agriculture, and in light of the limited scope and
effect of the farm credit  legislation, further action  by Congress  will
be  needed  if agriculture  is to be stabilized in the near term. Under a
policy  of no  further  intervention,  stability  would  eventually  occur
but the private and social costs accompanying  such a policy would be
high.  A March,  1986,  publication by the General  Accounting Office
(GAO) reports that a policy of no further intervention would result in
(1)  21  percent  of farm  assets  ($136  billion) being  sold  for  restruc-
turing purposes,  (2) 57 percent  of the debt  ($91 billion) being liqui-
dated,  (3) 25 percent  of the farm operators going out of business and
an additional  23 percent  selling some assets to remain  in business
and (4) $11 billion of debt being written off. As the GAO report points
out,  "Significant  economic and social  upheavals, particularly  in the
Midwest,  might  result.  The  capacity  of asset  markets,  institutions
and rural communities to adjust gradually to such changes is highly
questionable"  (p. 69).
The costs of intervention should be compared, not to the costs saved
from nonintervention, but to the private and social costs likely to be
incurred if nothing further is done. Further intervention would help
to protect the already large  investment of public funds  made in the
1985  Food Security  Act.  The  financial  situation in agriculture  is  of
sufficient  scale and severity to suggest  that consideration  of public
intervention  is justified (Harl 1986c).  In general, if the benefits from
intervention  (on a present  value basis) exceed the costs of interven-
ing, it is appropriate  to consider intervention.
Principles of intervention. Any intervention should be governed  by
agreed-upon  principles.  The  following are  suggested for the  United
States:
*  Intervention  should be  as broad  as the problem  giving rise  to
the intervention effort. Thus, intervention should not be just for
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twelve Farm Credit Districts with a total loan portfolio  of more
than  $65  billion)  which  is  currently  the  driving  force  behind
public  intervention  in  the United  States.  Although  the  Farm
Credit System is in grave financial condition, many commercial
banks  involved substantially  in lending to farmers face  similar
problems.  If intervention  were to be undertaken  at the  level  of
lenders,  the program  of intervention  should reasonably  extend
to all lenders. Otherwise farmers with identical farm operations
and debt loads would be treated differently,  depending upon who
their lender was. Thus, competitive  equilibrium  would likely be
disturbed, perhaps irrevocably.
*  Intervention should preferably be directed at stabilizing farmers
as borrowers.  Because  of the interrelationships  involved among
borrowers,  lenders,  merchants  and local  units  of government,
the problem is clearly a systems problem that calls for a systems
solution.  Intervention  efforts  designed  to  benefit  borrowers  at
the expense of lenders,  as with the classic  1930s  era  mortgage
foreclosure  moratoria,  have the  potential  to  do  a  great  deal  of
damage to the financial  system.
With that thought in mind, it is clear that if farmers are not stable,
lenders are  unlikely to be or become stable.  If farmers as borrowers
are  made  substantially  stable,  then  others-lenders,  suppliers  and
rural communities generally-should also become stable. It would be
an extremely costly venture to attempt to stabilize lenders if farmers
are not substantially  stable.
*  Intervening  on  behalf  of  lenders  could  be  justified  on  the
grounds of expediency  in avoiding collapse of the lending system
by keeping lenders in a viable state.  The result, after an initial
period  of adjustment,  could be  reduced cost  of credit to all bor-
rowers, not just those in financial difficulty. This poses the ques-
tion of whether intervention should be targeted.
*  To limit the cost of intervention and to avoid  perceptions  of un-
fair treatment  of farmers  over  nonfarmers  (many  of whom  are
also in financial trouble), targeting of benefits from intervention
is  necessary.  Widespread  public  acceptance  of realistic,  hard-
headed,  equitable  intervention  efforts  can  reasonably  be  ex-
pected.  But  little  public  acceptance  is  likely  if benefits  flow
heavily (even though not exclusively) to farmers not in financial
difficulty.  It is acknowledged that targeting of benefits from in-
tervention poses fairness problems  of a different  sort as farmers
who  are not under serious financial  stress may  resent benefits
flowing to those in financial  difficulty.
*  Programs  of intervention should be flexible in nature such that
if economic  circumstances  change, the program could be altered
or terminated.  This argues against heavy up-front expenditures
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of intervention.
*  Public  intervention should not interfere  unreasonably  with ad-
justment and economic  efficiency and should be governed by re-
alistic  long-term  expectations  as  to  demand-supply,  price  and
profitability  relationships.  A  major  benefit  of intervention  is
avoidance  of "overshooting"  of equilibrium conditions.
*  It is  not  unreasonable  to request  assistance  from  the general
public,  but  the public's  investment  in  intervention  should be
protected if economic circumstances  were to change and agricul-
ture were  to return  soon to profitability  or land values were to
increase substantially  for other reasons.
*  Agriculture is  not the only  sector of the economy experiencing
serious economic difficulty.  Any sector or subsector that is both
capital  intensive  and export sensitive  is suffering  from the  ef-
fects of high interest rates, a strong dollar and weak demand  in
countries pressed  to keep their debt  obligations  serviced.  Most
of the sectors or subsectors experiencing stress, other than agri-
culture, can more easily respond to financial pressure by reduc-
ing  output  to  obtain  relief  as  to  price.  Because  no  single
producer  in agriculture  is sufficiently  large to  influence  price,
reduction of output  is less likely without  intervention.  In  gen-
eral, society benefits from this feature  of agriculture in the form
of greater  output  and lower  product  prices  than  would  be  the
case otherwise.  However,  occasionally  agriculture  needs help in
adjusting if serious economic damage is to be avoided from over-
production.
Evaluating programs of intervention. An almost  infinite  array  of
public sector interventions is possible for most policy problems.  This
is certainly the case with the current  financial crisis in agriculture.
Although  evaluations  are  difficult to  make,  inasmuch  as proposals
are  understandably  diverse  in their basic features  and  characteris-
tics, it is essential to an objective review and appraisal that proposals
be evaluated  on the basis  of an agreed-upon  set of criteria.  For the
farm financial  crisis, it is suggested that the set of criteria  include,
for both intervention and nonintervention, (1) the direct and indirect
costs to taxpayers  and consumers, (2) who receives the benefits  from
intervention,  (3) whether the proposal  is likely to stabilize the farm-
ing sector and whether reasonable  stability  is likely to be extended
to lenders and suppliers, (4) who bears the risks of further declines in
asset values,  (5) who  bears the risks  of future  changes  in  interest
rates and other costs of production,  (6) who  receives the benefits  of
future increases in asset values, (7) whether the proposal encourages
necessary resource adjustment and promotes economic efficiency,  and
(8) the administrative  costs expected to be associated with the imple-
mentation and operation  of the specific  proposal.
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means to facilitate the adjustment process,  minimize the costs of ad-
justment and avoid the consequences of over adjustment or the over-
shooting  of  what  should  be  equilibrium  conditions.  If  present
economic conditions  continue,  resource  adjustment  at the firm level
will be needed under any reasonable scenario  of intervention.  In the
event that the economic  environment  were  to return  to more  favor-
able economic  conditions for agriculture,  the amount  of adjustment
needed would be proportionately  less.
The eight criteria identified  above are discussed  elsewhere in sub-
stantial detail (Harl 1986c).
Possible  Programs of Intervention
No public intervention. A policy of no intervention could be followed
with the burden of adjustment left to borrowers,  lenders  and others
to pursue available remedies. Lenders would be expected to foreclose
on real estate  mortgages;  proceed with remedies under the Uniform
Commercial Code in the event of default on obligations with personal
property  as collateral;  forfeit the rights  of defaulting  buyers  under
installment  land  contracts;  and work out repayment  arrangements
under  informal compositions  with borrowers.  Among  the latter are
voluntary,  privately-arranged  restructuring  efforts  as principal  bal-
ances are written down or interest rates are reduced or both. Heavily
indebted farmers  at or approaching  insolvency would be expected to
file  for bankruptcy  under  U.S. Bankruptcy Code  Chapter 7 (liquida-
tion) or Chapters  11  or 13 (reorganization)  options, voluntarily turn
over assets to creditors  in satisfaction  of debt  obligations or sell  as-
sets and apply the proceeds of sale on amounts owed.
In  some areas  of the  United  States,  a  policy  of nonintervention
probably  would  not create  unacceptable  levels of economic  trauma.
However,  available data indicate that in some areas substantial  eco-
nomic  costs would be  incurred  in terms  of loss of wealth,  failure  of
financial  institutions,  insolvency  by suppliers  and shrinkage  of the
economic and social base of rural communities. The effects of a policy
of no  further  intervention  are  outlined  in  the  March,  1986,  GAO
report discussed  above (General Accounting Office  1986).
Debt restructuring with loan guarantees. The  debt  restructuring
program  announced  by  President  Reagan  on  September  18,  1984,
was an effort in meeting the debt problems of commercial agriculture
in the United States (Harl  1986b).4 If a farmer could show cash flow
equal to  110  percent  of costs and  debt service  on  a projected basis,
and the lender were to write down at least 10 percent of the principal
value of the loan,  a guarantee  of up to 90 percent  of the remaining
principal balance  could be obtained from FmHA.  This program, the
Debt Adjustment Program (DAP), was intended for loans classified as
substandard by the lender's supervising agency.  The rules  specified
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initial  10 percent  of principal  to  meet the  cash flow  requirements.
Loans with adequate  security generally  do not require a write down
by the lender to obtain a guaranty  under the regular loan guaranty
program.  Announcements  on February  6 and 22,  1985,  of modifica-
tions in the program reduced  the cash flow requirement  for  eligible
participants  from  110  percent  to  100  percent  of projected  cash  flow
and permitted lenders  to take the required principal write  down in
the form of interest rate reductions to borrowers  spread over several
years.5 Moreover,  assurances  were  given that additional  loan  guar-
anty authority  would  be  made  available  if needed.  However,  it be-
came apparent in March, 1985, that loan guaranty authority was not
available  to restructure real estate  loans.6 Loan guaranty authority
was available to restructure loans over seven years with the possibil-
ity of a balloon payment. Final regulations  were published on Febru-
ary 15,  1985.7
If available for real estate loans and with adequate amounts of loan
guaranty authority, debt restructuring through federal loan guaran-
tees would provide buoyancy to land and machinery  markets to help
the asset restructuring  that must take  place to occur on  a rational
basis.  Loan  guarantees  only  minimally  interrupt  and  distort  eco-
nomic relationships and represent a good solution in many ways. The
farmer is encouraged  to remain with debt obligations on a deferred
payment basis rather than to file for bankruptcy or use other reme-
dies.
An "upside"  eligibility test is imposed  by requiring a significant
write down of interest or principal or both by lenders. Borrowers who
are  likely to be able to service  outstanding debt and stabilize their
financial  condition  would  not  be  admitted  to  the  program.  The
"downside"  eligibility test, rendering  ineligible  those who have  no
reasonable  likelihood of surviving financially,  is administered  in the
form of the cash-flow requirement.
One  of the  most  difficult  features  of DAP  arose  in dealing  with
outstanding unsecured  debt. The rules specifically required that the
loans remaining after the debt restructuring must be adequately  se-
cured. 8 Moreover,  the rules  required  that the  plan  submitted  deal
with  all debt,  secured  as well as unsecured.  The  secured  and unse-
cured  creditors  were  expected  to negotiate  for  write-offs  and repay-
ment terms  which  might  have been  made  different by the security
position  of creditors.
Facilitating  land holding and financing.  Because of the importance
of interest rates in any effort to stabilize farm and ranch firms, one
approach  would be  to channel  state and federal  funds  directly  into
interest rate reductions  for farm loans. At the same time, there is a
need  for  assets,  particularly farmland  held by those  so  heavily  in-
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the market.
It is believed that the two functions,  interest rate reductions and a
"holding tank" for farm assets, should be joined in one entity if possi-
ble  (Harl  1986a,  1984).  Unless  the economic  environment  changes
dramatically  very  soon,  major  adjustments  in  organization  of farm
and ranch firms must take place to reflect the realities of the 1980s.
Farmers  should  be  encouraged  to  develop  realistic  cash  flow/
reorganization  plans that will,  if possible,  stabilize the firm.  Some
interest  rate  reductions  (on the  order  of 3  to  5  percentage  points)
should be available  to assist in making the cash flow/reorganization
plans feasible.  If the  firm cannot  be  stabilized  under  those  condi-
tions,  changes  in  enterprises,  management  approaches  and  asset
ownership may be necessary.
The proposal  for  formation of an Agricultural  Financing Corpora-
tion (AFC) has  two major  components.  One  component,  referred  to
below as Component B, would provide the supplemental financing for
"buying  down"  interest  rates on farm  loans for  feasible  cash  flow/
reorganization plans on a targeted basis but with an expectation that
interest subsidies would eventually  be repaid with some  interest on
amounts  advanced.  Component  A  would  provide  a  mechanism  for
acquiring the assets, notably farmland,  given up by farmers who are
unable to  develop  a  feasible  cash  flow/reorganization  plan  short  of
asset liquidation. This entity could acquire land (1) subject to foreclo-
sure or bankruptcy,  (2) from lenders holding land in inventory or (3)
from farmers who are unable to service the real estate debt. The land
would be rented  back to the farmer at a  reasonable  rental and the
farmer would be encouraged to repurchase the land as soon as possi-
ble.
Although  various  possible  designs  of entities  would  appear to be
feasible,  a federally chartered  corporation,  similar in some  respects
to the U.S.  Commodity Credit  Corporation,  would be the basic vehi-
cle.  It  is anticipated  that  the corporation,  referred  to  here  as  the
Agricultural  Financing  Corporation,  would have a  governing board
that would be broadly representative  of production  agriculture, pub-
lic and private sector lending and agribusiness firms and with signif-
icant consumer  and taxpayer representation.
It is important to note that both components, an interest rate buy-
down and a holding tank for farm  assets, were included  in the  1985
legislation.  With  adequate  funding  and  if open  to all  lenders,  the
capital  corporation  could serve  the holding tank function  given  ap-
propriate  "marching  orders."  The  $490 million  of funds for interest
buy-downs (over three years) is about one-twentieth enough funds for
that purpose.
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NOTES
iSome firms, because of unusually capable management,  unusually good production records  or unusually favorable
price for output have  returns to  equity high  enough to  be economically  and financially  stable even with  debt-to-
asset ratios above 40 percent.
2For the criteria  for  classifying farm  businesses into  seven categories,  see  Lines  and Morehart,  note  9,  Table  1.
Categories six and seven were considered to include firms with  "poor financial health."
3Some commentators  focusing only on the macro side of the farm debt crisis, seem to have  ignored this response by
those suffering  losses.
4See  Fed.  Reg.,  49 (1984):  41,220, 41,223.  The announcement  outlined a  four-part  initiative. See  also  FmHA  In-
structions, Exhibit B  to  1980-B,  Code of Fed.  Reg.,  7 (1985):  1980.200.
5See Fed.  Reg.,  50 (1985):9987,  9988-91.
6Loan guaranty  authority, since March,  1985, has  not been available to restructure real estate loans even  though
the regulations clearly  provide for the restructuring of farm ownership (real estate)  loans as well as farm operat-
ing (non real estate) loans. See Fed. Reg.,  50 (1985):  6880, 6881:  "lb  meet  the expected  needs of DAP, a significant
amount of funds available for guaranteeing  FO and OL loans will  be made available for this program."
7The regulations  were amended  in late 1985 to  add a  line of credit authority  for guaranteed operating  loans. Fed.
Reg.,  50 (1985):  39,880.
8FmHA Instructions,  Exhibit B to 1980-B,  Code of Fed. Reg.,  7(1985):  § 1980.200. The concepts were first  discussed
in Harl,  Neil  E. "Draft  Proposal for Interim Land Ownership."  Ames:  Iowa State  University, Nov. 27,  1984.
89